C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTIAGO 000100
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: SNAR, PTER, PHUM, PREL, CI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EXPLORES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENDA WITH GOC
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly for reason 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador explored post's law
enforcement agenda with Chile's Head of Intelligence and
Chiefs of the uniformed police force and investigative police
force on January 6. GOC authorities maintained that
terrorist activity, including terrorism financing, is hard to
confirm in Chile, and investigations continue. The Director
of the new Chilean National Intelligence Agency (ANI)
emphasized that the agency would function only as an
analytical center. The GOC reps left the door open for an
on-call international peacekeeping force. Regional police
cooperation remains limited. The Chief of National Police,
whose forces are on the ground in Haiti, does not see the
situation there improving. The police offered to provide
protection for further post inquiries into the Weisfeiler
case. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador Kelly hosted a lunch for Gustavo
Villalobos, Director of the National Intelligence Agency
(ANI), General Alberto Cienfuegos of Carabineros (uniformed
police) and Chief Arturo Herrera of PICH, the investigative
police force. Accompanying the Ambassador were the Legal
Attache, DEA, RAO, RSO and EPOL. Although the event was
ostensibly a "thank-you" for assistance provided to the U.S.
during the recent APEC summit in Santiago, the Ambassador
used the gathering to explore a range of issues on post's law
enforcement agenda.
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New Intel Organization Focused on Analysis, not Ops
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3. (C) Villalobos described ANI as an intelligence
coordinating agency providing analytical support to the
President of Chile, somewhat similar to the NSC. He was
careful to note the organization does not conduct
intelligence operations. Representatives from the
Carabineros (uniformed police) and PICH (investigative
police) staff ANI on special detail assignments. Responding
to Cienfuegos' question regarding ANI's role in military
intelligence, Villalobos remarked that a clear separation
exists between the two. (Comment: Villalobos seemed careful
not to create expectations for ANI, particularly on the
operations side. At the same time, ANI and the USG are
collaborating on some investigation activities.
Significantly, ANI is the first GOC agency to incorporate
elements of both PICH and Carabineros, whose relationship
tends to be more competitive than cooperative. End Comment).
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OAS Convention is for Prosecutors
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4. (C) Villalobos noted that the OAS Convention on Legal
Cooperation is a law enforcement tool, and not relevant to
the work of ANI. In regard to intelligence work, the
Convention is not repeat not a mechanism to exchange judicial
information, nor as a framework for bilateral legal
cooperation. He added that the GOC would likely support the
use of the Convention, but that his organization was not part
of the process. (Comment: Post will explore the appropriate
applicability and usefulness of the Convention further with
the MFA Legal Advisor. End Comment.)
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Carabineros Downbeat on Haiti
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5. (C) 30 Carabineros and 2 PICH officers make up the Chilean
peacekeeping force in Haiti. Carabineros Chief Cienfuegos
talked at length of his recent visit to Haiti, noting
pessimistically that the situation seemed grave and unlikely
to improve. Haiti seemed chronically poor, and internal
friction among Haitians and with aid organizations
contributed to the country's dismal prospects. Post officers
floated the idea of establishing a permanent, on-call
peacekeeping force, noting that Brazil had recently been
asked by the EU to do the same. Cienfuegos appeared open to
the possibility, commenting that joining Brazil would be
interesting.
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Regional Police Cooperation Continues
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6. (C) Cienfuegos said that carabineros cooperate with
counterparts in neighboring countries, and that good
police-to-police relations existed. At times, however, the
politics of individual countries created friction, and he
cited Bolivia as one example. Villalobos added that the GOC
works with Peru on specific cases, but that the relationship
is not very close. DEA head discussed the USG-funded officer
exchange programs, noting that no matter what the political
situation, the police forces worked better together as a
result. He cited Bolivia and Peru as examples. Cienfuegos
agreed that this type of "go-between" programs works well.
7. (C) Post officers suggested the idea of establishing a
multi-agency task force to conduct joint operations and
investigations, citing the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
and the USG newly created counter-terrorism center as models
of how to make better use of intelligence. Villalobos warned
of the difficulty of integrating different types of
information and security services. (Comment: DEA had
previously suggested the idea of a multi-agency task force
separately to Villalobos and Herrera. Suggesting this idea
during lunch was an effort to test the waters with
Cienfuegos, who did not specifically respond, as well as
openly bring up the task force concept to all three law
enforcement chiefs. End Comment.)
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GOC Sees No Terrorist Activity in Chile
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8. (C) Cienfuegos said that international terrorism does not
exist in Chile, and that only local terrorists acted up
occasionally. Villalobos pointed out that no armed groups
operate in Chile. While the GOC continues to participate in
3 1 meetings on the Tri-Border area, Villalobos noted that he
had no hard confirmation of terrorist financing or other
activity occurring in Iquique (a city in northern Chile with
a significant population of Pakistanis and Lebanese). At the
same time, Villalobos acknowledged that money from car sales
or contraband in Iquique is being sent to unknown recipients,
but noted that the prosecution of these individuals is
difficult. Cienfuegos opined that criminal cases of
terrorism and particularly terrorist financing are not as
easy to prove as drug cases. (Comment: The current judicial
architecture in Chile is not conducive to conducting
long-term intelligence investigations without clear evidence
or indications of a crime. The judicial architecture is
strong with respect to counter-narcotics investigations,
enjoying relatively robust omnibus counter-narcotics laws
that facilitate investigations. End Comment.)
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Judges Reluctant to Pursue Terrorism Cases
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9. (C) Villalobos pointed out that judges have not
traditionally prosecuted counter-terrorism cases. However,
in the new judicial reform system, prosecutors, particularly
those who are younger and have a global perspective, may be
more willing to do so. Cienfuegos noted it will take time
for judges to understand the reform.
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Suggestions on the Weisfeiler Case
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10. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG maintains on-going
interest in resolving the Weisfeiler case. Cienfuegos agreed
to provide protection from the Carabineros for a consular
officer to visit La Colonia Dignidad, a colony of German
expatriates in southern Chile. He added that the Carabineros
have access to the colony, but requested post to speak with
the German Ambassador prior to a visit. Cienfuegos asked if
post had interviewed Manuel Contreras, former head of intel
and founder of the now dissolved DINA organization (secret
police), and suggested now may be a good time to speak with
him. Cienfuegos also encouraged continued embassy
discussions with Judge Solis of the appellate court.
KELLY