USUN NEW Y 00001538 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POL MINS-COUNS WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) Expectations are mounting ahead of August 17 United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations on Darfur, and
the question remains of how to proceed on the draft
resolution authorizing transition of the African Union (AU)
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN operation. The draft is
stuck in the P5, and we must proceed on the basis of an
emerging agreement in the P3, bolstered with African support
in the Council. China and Russia flatly refuse to go any
further without Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU)
consent. Clearly some sort of engagement is needed to
progress on adoption and implementation of the draft text,
and this cable outlines some ideas and proposals to achieving
this end. END SUMMARY.
NO CONSENT, NO RESOLUTION
-------------------------
2. (C) In an August 11 Experts Meeting both Chinese and
Russian representatives stated unequivocally that neither
Beijing nor Moscow would support adoption of the draft text
without Khartoum's consent, even though both delegates
admitted that such consent at this stage was not technically
necessary for passage of the resolution. In P5 meetings, the
Chinese delegate acknowledged that Khartoum had responded to
pressure from the international community in the past, but
warned that to do so with the draft resolution currently
under consideration could undermine the resolution's eventual
implementation, which will necessitate GNU consent as a
prerequisite. The Russian delegate shared this assessment.
3. (C) No doubt that when the draft resolution is circulated
to the wider Council, possibly by August 20, Qatar will echo
these sentiments and insist on GNU consent for adoption. The
African UNSC Members told USUN informally they would support
pushing ahead with adoption without Khartoum's consent, but
they have not responded with comments on the draft resolution
text we passed to them. It remains to be seen if in August
17 Darfur consultations they will put their money where their
mouth is in the face of strenuous Chinese, Russian and Qatari
opposition.
TURNING SYG RECOMMENDATION ON ITS HEAD
--------------------------------------
4. (C) The UN seems to be exhausting its diplomatic
possibilities with regard to Khartoum. At his monthly
luncheon with the UNSC on August 11, SYG Annan outlined a
plan to invite GNU officials (possibly FM Lam Akol or even
President Bashir) to New York to answer to their continued
opposition to a UN Darfur force to the Security Council.
Also discussed was the possibility of including AU Commission
Chairperson Konare and Arab League Secretary-General Amre
Moussa in such a session to account for the current stalled
situation in AMIS transition.
5. (C) USUN believes such an approach would be
counterproductive. While a personal audience with the
Security Council could give the Sudanese government the
'face' it seeks in the eyes of the international community,
taking Sudan to task in such a setting could have the
unintended effect of further strengthening GNU resolve
against granting its consent for deployment of UN forces in
Darfur, especially if a resolution were adopted 'against its
will' prior to this meeting. Conversely, such a meeting
could stall the timetable for consideration of the draft
resolution if convened before the resolution's adoption,
giving the GNU a chance to exercise its unofficial veto over
Council action by delaying its RSVP or otherwise prolonging
USUN NEW Y 00001538 002.2 OF 002
its consideration of the invitation. Further, inviting FM
Lam would have no effect on GNU decisions, and President
Bashir would likely either refuse to come or use the meeting
as a soapbox for his refusal of AMIS transition.
Conversations with UKUN indicated an assessment similar to
ours on prospects for success of such a meeting. We would be
interested in Embassy Khartoum's views on the SYG's proposal.
HELP US HELP YOU
----------------
6. (C) Rather than bringing Sudan before its Council critics,
USUN recommends taking our show on the road to Khartoum to
'court' President Bashir, following on reftel
recommendations. Just as former Deputy Secretary Zoellick's
personal engagement in Abuja helped to turn the tide for the
Darfur Peace Agreement, so too could a visit by a high-level
U.S. diplomat to Sudan for the re-hatting resolution.
7. (C) The message could be concise and clear and couched in
terms of mutual benefit: help us help you to safeguard
Darfur. The envoy could clarify any GNU concerns about the
draft resolution while remaining honest about the Council's
intentions to adopt it expeditiously. Any incentives package
could best be delivered in such a setting. In this way, we
could determine the timetable and not be held hostage to
Khartoum's stall tactics, and President Bashir would get the
visible 'supplication' he considers so integral to his
granting of consent without being conspicuously subjected to
the scrutiny of the Council in New York, a face-saving
mechanism in itself.
AGREE OCTOBER 1 AND EXPEDITE ADOPTION
-------------------------------------
8. (C) Pushing through a fully realized October 1 transition
date becomes more difficult with each passing day as the
practical realities of what is feasible by then continue to
shrink. However, we have worked out OP4 language with the UK
that addresses a transition process that would, all things
being equal, take effect on October 1. Department guidance
on this language is appreciated. While France originally
objected to our insistence on October 1, UKUN seems convinced
France will accept our compromise language, which, bracketed
troops numbers in OP3 aside, would allow us to move a P3 text
forward formally to the African UNSC Members as soon as
possible.
9. (C) It is not expected, based on preliminary consultations
with the African Members, that they will object to the draft
resolution. Once their agreement is secured, we can
circulate the draft text to the whole Council for
consideration, hopefully as early as August 17 consultations.
Japan will likely voice the same concerns as did France over
the October 1 date (for budgetary reasons) but would be more
likely to come on board if the French had done the same. No
real opposition is expected from the other European and Latin
American UNSC Members. If the issue of GNU consent is
unexpectedly addressed by this point, no real opposition
should be expected either from China or Russia or, by
extension, from Qatar.
BOLTON
| UNSC/SUDAN: SO CLOSE YET STILL SO FAR AWAY FROM DARFUR RESOLUTION | |
2006 August 15, 12:34 (Tuesday) |
06USUNNEWYORK1538_a |
CONFIDENTIAL |
CONFIDENTIAL |
|
-- Not Assigned -- |
6970 |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TEXT ONLINE |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
|
African Union | Belgium Brussels | Canada Ottawa | Chad N''Djamena | Djibouti Djibouti | Egypt Cairo | Eritrea Asmara | Ethiopia Addis Ababa | Kenya Nairobi | Libya Tripoli | National Security Council | Nigeria Abuja | Norway Oslo | Secretary of State | Sudan Darfur Collective | Sudan Khartoum | The League of Arab States | Uganda Kampala | United Nations Security Council |
|
Content
Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001538
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SU, UNSC, KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: SO CLOSE YET STILL SO FAR AWAY FROM
DARFUR RESOLUTION
REF: USUN NEW YORK 001349
USUN NEW Y 00001538 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POL MINS-COUNS WILLIAM BRENCICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) Expectations are mounting ahead of August 17 United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations on Darfur, and
the question remains of how to proceed on the draft
resolution authorizing transition of the African Union (AU)
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN operation. The draft is
stuck in the P5, and we must proceed on the basis of an
emerging agreement in the P3, bolstered with African support
in the Council. China and Russia flatly refuse to go any
further without Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU)
consent. Clearly some sort of engagement is needed to
progress on adoption and implementation of the draft text,
and this cable outlines some ideas and proposals to achieving
this end. END SUMMARY.
NO CONSENT, NO RESOLUTION
-------------------------
2. (C) In an August 11 Experts Meeting both Chinese and
Russian representatives stated unequivocally that neither
Beijing nor Moscow would support adoption of the draft text
without Khartoum's consent, even though both delegates
admitted that such consent at this stage was not technically
necessary for passage of the resolution. In P5 meetings, the
Chinese delegate acknowledged that Khartoum had responded to
pressure from the international community in the past, but
warned that to do so with the draft resolution currently
under consideration could undermine the resolution's eventual
implementation, which will necessitate GNU consent as a
prerequisite. The Russian delegate shared this assessment.
3. (C) No doubt that when the draft resolution is circulated
to the wider Council, possibly by August 20, Qatar will echo
these sentiments and insist on GNU consent for adoption. The
African UNSC Members told USUN informally they would support
pushing ahead with adoption without Khartoum's consent, but
they have not responded with comments on the draft resolution
text we passed to them. It remains to be seen if in August
17 Darfur consultations they will put their money where their
mouth is in the face of strenuous Chinese, Russian and Qatari
opposition.
TURNING SYG RECOMMENDATION ON ITS HEAD
--------------------------------------
4. (C) The UN seems to be exhausting its diplomatic
possibilities with regard to Khartoum. At his monthly
luncheon with the UNSC on August 11, SYG Annan outlined a
plan to invite GNU officials (possibly FM Lam Akol or even
President Bashir) to New York to answer to their continued
opposition to a UN Darfur force to the Security Council.
Also discussed was the possibility of including AU Commission
Chairperson Konare and Arab League Secretary-General Amre
Moussa in such a session to account for the current stalled
situation in AMIS transition.
5. (C) USUN believes such an approach would be
counterproductive. While a personal audience with the
Security Council could give the Sudanese government the
'face' it seeks in the eyes of the international community,
taking Sudan to task in such a setting could have the
unintended effect of further strengthening GNU resolve
against granting its consent for deployment of UN forces in
Darfur, especially if a resolution were adopted 'against its
will' prior to this meeting. Conversely, such a meeting
could stall the timetable for consideration of the draft
resolution if convened before the resolution's adoption,
giving the GNU a chance to exercise its unofficial veto over
Council action by delaying its RSVP or otherwise prolonging
USUN NEW Y 00001538 002.2 OF 002
its consideration of the invitation. Further, inviting FM
Lam would have no effect on GNU decisions, and President
Bashir would likely either refuse to come or use the meeting
as a soapbox for his refusal of AMIS transition.
Conversations with UKUN indicated an assessment similar to
ours on prospects for success of such a meeting. We would be
interested in Embassy Khartoum's views on the SYG's proposal.
HELP US HELP YOU
----------------
6. (C) Rather than bringing Sudan before its Council critics,
USUN recommends taking our show on the road to Khartoum to
'court' President Bashir, following on reftel
recommendations. Just as former Deputy Secretary Zoellick's
personal engagement in Abuja helped to turn the tide for the
Darfur Peace Agreement, so too could a visit by a high-level
U.S. diplomat to Sudan for the re-hatting resolution.
7. (C) The message could be concise and clear and couched in
terms of mutual benefit: help us help you to safeguard
Darfur. The envoy could clarify any GNU concerns about the
draft resolution while remaining honest about the Council's
intentions to adopt it expeditiously. Any incentives package
could best be delivered in such a setting. In this way, we
could determine the timetable and not be held hostage to
Khartoum's stall tactics, and President Bashir would get the
visible 'supplication' he considers so integral to his
granting of consent without being conspicuously subjected to
the scrutiny of the Council in New York, a face-saving
mechanism in itself.
AGREE OCTOBER 1 AND EXPEDITE ADOPTION
-------------------------------------
8. (C) Pushing through a fully realized October 1 transition
date becomes more difficult with each passing day as the
practical realities of what is feasible by then continue to
shrink. However, we have worked out OP4 language with the UK
that addresses a transition process that would, all things
being equal, take effect on October 1. Department guidance
on this language is appreciated. While France originally
objected to our insistence on October 1, UKUN seems convinced
France will accept our compromise language, which, bracketed
troops numbers in OP3 aside, would allow us to move a P3 text
forward formally to the African UNSC Members as soon as
possible.
9. (C) It is not expected, based on preliminary consultations
with the African Members, that they will object to the draft
resolution. Once their agreement is secured, we can
circulate the draft text to the whole Council for
consideration, hopefully as early as August 17 consultations.
Japan will likely voice the same concerns as did France over
the October 1 date (for budgetary reasons) but would be more
likely to come on board if the French had done the same. No
real opposition is expected from the other European and Latin
American UNSC Members. If the issue of GNU consent is
unexpectedly addressed by this point, no real opposition
should be expected either from China or Russia or, by
extension, from Qatar.
BOLTON
Metadata
VZCZCXRO0718
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1538/01 2271234
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151234Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9838
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0366
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0934
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0762
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1166
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0706
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0074
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0247
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0326
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0491
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0185
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0674
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0796
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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