C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001538
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KJUS, TH
SUBJECT: THAI RAK THAI LEADER WORRIED ABOUT THE FUTURE
REF: A. BANGKOK 1249 (CHATURON AT FCCT)
B. BANGKOK 1187 (WINAI LUNCH)
C. BANGKOK 1036 (SOMKID RESIGNS)
D. BANGKOK 1034 (CHATURON DEFIES RESTRICTIONS)
E. 06 BANGKOK 6474 (CHATURON REPOSITIONING TRT)
F. 06 BANGKOK 6366 (CHATURON MEETS AMBASSADOR)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
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1. (C) Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng
fears the coup leaders will not allow a free election if that
would result in a TRT victory. In a March 13 meeting at the
Ambassador's residence, Chaturon said the Army's own polling
showed high popular support for TRT; TRT's continuing
popularity made many leading officials reluctant to leave the
party. The Constitutional Tribunal had no legal grounds to
dissolve TRT, and if the Tribunal were to do so, TRT figures
would fight for their right to form a new party with the TRT
name. Protests against the authorities could grow, although
this was not TRT's preference; some demonstrations not
directly associated with TRT were planned for the weekend of
March 17-18. Chaturon claimed the authorities fully intended
to prosecute him for undertaking political activities in the
Northeast, but they had no grounds to do so. End Summary.
CONCERNED ABOUT TRIBUNAL, ELECTION
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2. (C) In a March 13 meeting at the Ambassador's residence,
TRT Party Leader Chaturon Chaiseng expressed uncertainty
about how the Constitutional Tribunal would decide the
pending case involving alleged undemocratic acts by TRT in
early 2006. Chaturon told the Ambassador none of the
evidence presented at the Tribunal's proceedings --
principally statements by witnesses -- implicated TRT in
illegal acts. Many witnesses previously claimed TRT hired
smaller parties in order to provide straw man competition in
the April 2006 election; in the current proceedings, these
witnesses claimed that the Democrat Party had pressured them
into making false allegations.
3. (C) Chaturon pointedly emphasized the Tribunal did not
function as a Court, its members did not have royal
appointments, and, irrespective of their other positions or
qualifications, they did not function as judges when in their
Tribunal capacity. Furthermore, the Tribunal had no legal
grounds for imposing sanctions on TRT, because the coup
leaders had abolished the 1997 Constitution and the organic
laws that had provided for legal proceedings in the pre-coup
era. It would be unfair to retroactively apply the very
stiff penalty -- a five-year ban on political activities for
executive board members of dissolved parties -- decreed by
the Generals after the coup. Even the weaker sanctions in
the Law on Political Parties could not justly be applied
against TRT, because the law had been scrapped for two days
after the coup, until reinstated by the Generals. The fact
that the current law was abolished and then reinstated meant
that application of its provisions to early 2006 alleged
infractions were technically retroactive. Chaturon said he
had consulted legal experts from the European Union, who
agreed with his view.
4. (C) Tribunal officials appeared to be independent-minded
persons, rather than lackeys of the Generals, Chaturon said
(consistent with his view expressed in October -- ref F).
They would not be quick to follow anyone's instructions, and
Chaturon assessed they likely would make a fair decision
unless placed under substantial pressure. Nevertheless, he
worried that leading Generals had exerted undue influence by
publicly predicting TRT's dissolution, and he worried they
might go so far as to order that the Tribunal impose this
sanction. (Note: General Winai Phattiyakul, one of the most
influential Generals on the Council for National Security
(CNS), privately predicted to the Ambassador that TRT would
be dissolved -- ref B. End Note.)
5. (C) Chaturon believed the Tribunal might dissolve TRT but
allow the party to reincarnate itself, even using the Thai
Rak Thai name. In a worse-case scenario, however, the
Tribunal might dissolve TRT, forbid the formation of a new
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TRT, and ban former TRT Executive Board members from
political activities for five years. In the event of a
prejudicial ruling by the Tribunal, TRT would focus all its
energies on demanding the right to register a new party as
soon as possible and compete in a fair election. Denying TRT
this right would be "terrible," Chaturon said, depriving the
party's 14 million members from the type of political
participation they desired. Popular frustration could lead
to rallies, demonstrations, and even possibly "chaos,"
although TRT would maintain its non-confrontational,
non-violent stance. Chaturon said he was aware of protests
planned for the weekend of March 17-18, at the Royal Grounds
and at Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda's residence.
He said warily that TRT was "trying to avoid involvement" in
these protests, implying the demonstrators' agenda was not
constructive.
OUTLOOK FOR ELECTIONS
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6. (C) Chaturon worried that the CNS would feel compelled to
coerce the Tribunal into dissolving TRT because TRT remained
overwhelmingly popular in its strongholds. The Army had
conducted opinion polling that showed over 90 percent of the
people in the Northeast favored TRT. In the North, TRT
maintained over 80 percent support, while TRT polled at 70-75
percent in Central Thailand. Even in Bangkok, TRT was more
popular than its rivals, according to published figures from
reputable polling institute ABAC. Chaturon said the CNS --
and specifically General Saprang Kalayanamitr -- would not
tolerate a TRT victory.
7. (C) Many important figures in TRT were aware of the Army's
unpublished polling results, Chaturon said, and they
therefore were reluctant to abandon the party, fearing they
would lose in later elections. Chaturon asserted, as he
often has before, that TRT re-made Thai politics by
convincing Thais they could and should cast their votes based
on parties and policies, rather than personalities.
Vote-buying was no longer as effective as it had been in the
past, Chaturon said, citing the electoral defeats of some
wealthy figures (NFI) in pre-coup elections.
8. (C) TRT could garner a substantial sympathy vote, Chaturon
predicted -- especially if Tribunal were to dissolve the
party (but then allow it to re-form), or if the Tribunal were
to appear biased by applying sanctions to TRT but not to the
rival Democrat Party. Chaturon felt it possible that TRT
could win a majority in the next elections. Under certain
conditions, the party might even win in a landslide. TRT's
margin of victory would not depend much on whether the next
constitution were to provide for multi-member or
single-member districts, or allow for a party list, although
Chaturon expressed a preference for the system codified in
the 1997 Constitution (single-member districts, with a party
list.).
TRT DEFECTIONS
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9. (C) Chaturon believed defectors from TRT were unlikely to
detract meaningfully from his party's performance in the next
election, provided TRT was allowed to compete. He
categorized former Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak
as relatively inexperienced, as shown by the February fiasco,
when he was appointed to a government commission and resigned
soon thereafter (ref C). Chaturon said Somsak Thepsuthin --
leader of the largest group of ex-TRT legislators -- had
shown policy ineptitude. While TRT had reaffirmed its
support for populist initiatives, Somsak recently sought to
promote the raising of fighting cocks and the breeding of
fighting fish. Chaturon acknowledged former Deputy Prime
Minister Suwat Liptapanlop might win a cluster of seats in
his home province of Nakhon Ratchasima -- but Suwat and
others were unable to draw public attention to their new
parties so long as the CNS maintained current restrictions on
party activities (ref D). Thus, ironically, the CNS's
restrictions gave TRT an advantage over many potential rivals.
10. (C) Many people had defected from TRT because they felt
doing so might help them to win political protection from
corruption investigations, Chaturon said. Others doubted TRT
would survive and did not want to waste time on a lost cause.
BANGKOK 00001538 003 OF 003
Chaturon related that Somsak had privately stressed to
Chaturon that no Thai political party forced out of power by
a coup had ever staged a comeback. Chaturon believed Somsak
was wrong to disregard the extent to which TRT and its
policies still commanded widespread loyalty.
CHATURON'S PROSECUTION
----------------------
11. (C) When asked whether he thought government officials
intended to prosecute him for campaign-like activities in the
Northeast (ref D), Chaturon said they definitely did. The
police, Election Commission (EC), and another "security
organization" (NFI) had begun investigating his actions. The
police had appointed a committee to work on his case, and
they had submitted evidence to the EC, which was also
gathering information on him from its provincial
subcommittees. Chaturon reiterated his public claim that he
had done nothing wrong. If arrested, he said, he would
refuse to post bail, if any would be required, using his
detention to highlight this injustice. Chaturon said he
would discuss this matter publicly in the near future,
chiding the EC for not performing its proper function, which
Chaturon described as advocating for the rights of political
parties. The Ambassador said detaining Chaturon would likely
backfire, harming the CNS's interests. The Ambassador,
without naming his interlocutor, described to Chaturon his
February 26 conversation with General Winai (ref B), in which
he had urged Winai to consider carefully how best to respond
to Chaturon's trip to the Northeast, and to weigh the
possible international repercussions.
TIES TO THAKSIN
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12. (C) The Ambassador asked about Chaturon's ties to
Thaksin. Chaturon reiterated his public statement that
Thaksin deserved substantial credit for TRT's popularity (ref
A), but he admitted it would be "unwise" for the party to be
too closely associated with Thaksin. Chaturon said TRT would
send a signal of its break from the Thaksin era by shifting
its headquarters in mid-April (deliberately timing this move
to come shortly before the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling)
to a new, less expensive site.
CHAVALIT NOT A FACTOR
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13. (C) Chaturon -- who formerly served as Secretary General
in Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's New Aspiration Party (NAP) --
downplayed the prospects of Chavalit exercising influence in
TRT circles. (After the coup, Chavalit said publicly he
might take on a leading role in TRT.) A close aide of
Chavalit (NFI) had informed some current TRT figures that
Chavalit and former Justice Minister Chalerm Yubamrung would
work together to form a party, with Chavalit as the Party
Leader. (Note: Chalerm is widely seen as corrupt and
nefarious; he split from the NAP when the NAP merged with
TRT. End Note.) At this point, TRT had little interest in
maintaining a close relationship with Chavalit.
COMMENT
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14. (C) Chaturon is correct that TRT reshaped Thai politics
in significant ways, but he may overstate the electoral
prospects of the battered and hobbled version of TRT that he
currently leads. After bouncing around in formal politics
for two decades before unexpectedly being handed control of
what had become Thailand's most powerful party, Chaturon may
be prone to wishful thinking. We do, however, agree with
Chaturon's assessment that serious consequences may ensue if
the former top officials of TRT, and the party's grassroots
supporters, feel that they are denied the opportunity to
participate fully in the next election.
BOYCE