C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000957
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, MOPS, KDEM, TH, BM
SUBJECT: RTA COMMANDER ANUPONG COMMITTED TO RULE OF LAW IN
THE SOUTH
REF: A. BANGKOK 943
B. BANGKOK 941
C. 07 BANGKOK 5619
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong
Paochinda told the Ambassador March 25 that the Thai military
was committed to addressing the unrest in Southern Thailand
via military operations that follow the rule of law and by
attempting to win over the hearts and minds of Southern
insurgents. Anupong stated his personal hope for democracy
in Burma but painted a limited role for the Thai Army in
pushing for political change there. End Summary.
ARMY TRYING HARD IN THE SOUTH BUT UNDERMANNED
---------------------------------------------
2. (C) In a March 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Royal Thai
Army Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paochinda said the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) would continue to support the RTG's strategy of
addressing Southern unrest. Most importantly, the RTG was
trying to "socialize" Southern insurgents by improving
social, political, educational, and economic conditions so as
to change the way of thinking of Southern insurgents.
Security forces and government officials would promote the
rule of law in order to prosecute suspected insurgents and
military operations were necessary to improve the security
situation. Anupong, however, was very frank in discussing
the challenges that the RTG faced. Regarding the social
aspects, the Army Commander said other Thai ministries have
had a difficult time making a positive impact and the South
would remain a long-term problem. One problem was
scholarships provided to southern students by Muslim
countries to study abroad. Upon returning to Thailand, these
students had difficulty integrating into the Thai society as
they were not proficient in Thai. The rule of law had been
difficult to implement as the Royal Thai Police had
difficulty building cases for prosecution. As such, the RTA
was working with the police to build cases and assist with
gathering evidence.
3. (C) Anupong admitted that RTA soldiers have been unable to
build close relationships with local communities and this had
reduced the effectiveness of military operations. To address
this issue, Anupong had decided to change RTA policy and
deploy troops in every district of the three Southern
provinces. Unfortunately, the RTA had struggled with
implementation as there were not enough troops to carry out
the policy. Another factor that had reduced the RTA's
ability to find insurgents was that the Army had been tasked
with securing locations such as schools, government
buildings, and temples. Despite this Anupong believed that
the RTA was making progress in resolving the Southern unrest.
4. (C) Anupong admitted that IEDs were a significant problem
for the RTA. Insurgents often planted bombs at night and,
therefore, the RTA was searching for the means to conduct
nighttime surveillance or to detect IEDs. The Army had been
considering purchasing UAVs for surveillance purposes but
budget constraints made this unlikely. The RTA was
consequently open to assistance in developing its
capabilities in dealing with IEDs.
ICRC ACCESS IN THE SOUTH?
-------------------------
5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated to Anupong that the USG
considered the South a domestic Thai issue but that the RTG
could possibly allay criticism from human rights
organizations (Ref A and B) if it provided the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with access to suspected
insurgents while in detention. Anupong said he was worried
that an ICRC role in monitoring detainees could be a first
step towards internationalization of the southern unrest.
Nonetheless, Anupong assessed the proposal worthy of
consideration but said a decision to allow access by the ICRC
would require a national level decision.
6. (C) Anupong emphasized to the Ambassador that he has
provided clear orders to troops in the South that the rule of
law must be followed. Sniper squads were not allowed to take
out suspected insurgents and detainees must be granted full
rights as allowed by Thai law. Torture, abuse, and
interrogation methods that did not meet international
standards would not be tolerated, Anupong said. Despite
these clear orders, Anupong allowed that it was possible that
individual soldiers could have broken the rules of
engagement. Anupong stressed that the RTA would immediately
investigate and hold soldiers accountable for their actions
if his orders had been broken.
MARTIAL LAW TO BE LIFTED?
-------------------------
7. (C) Anupong told the Ambassador that policies on access to
detainees may change soon as Prime Minister Samak's
government was reviewing martial law (Ref C) in Thailand.
Samak was expected to make a decision in early April, Anupong
said, and there was a distinct possibility the PM would lift
martial law throughout the country. If Samak did lift
martial law, policies regarding time limits for detentions in
the South would change. (Comment. Security procedures in the
deep South are also regulated by the 2005 Emergency Decree.
It is not clear to us that lifting martial law while leaving
the Emergency Decree in place would necessarily result in
significant changes to detention procedures. End Comment.)
RTA CONSTRAINED IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN BURMA
--------------------------------------------- -----------
8. (C) The Ambassador explained to Anupong that U.S. policy
on Burma supported the Burmese people's desire for democracy
and asked Anupong for his assessment of the situation there.
Anupong emphasized to the Ambassador that the RTA did not
have the means to bring about change in Burma. As Burma
policy was made at the national level, Anupong said his views
on Burma did not influence Thai policy on the matter.
Despite these challenges, Anupong wished he had the means to
assist in accelerating the transfer of power to a democratic
government in Burma. While acknowledging criticisms in the
drafting of the Burmese constitution, Anupong said he hoped
that the charter would be a starting point for progress
towards an elected government in Burma.
9. (C) Anupong described the difficulties that the RTA faced
due to the lengthy border Thailand shares with Burma and the
large population of Burmese living in Thailand. Border
security and narcotics trafficking were of primary concern
for the RTA in relation to Burma and one avenue for
engagement with the Burmese regime could be on narcotics
trafficking. Anupong, however, was worried that such
engagement would lead the Burmese regime to push for the RTG
to crack down on ethnic groups along the Thai-Burmese border.
10. (C) Despite his personal wishes for a democratic Burma,
Anupong expressed concern that the ethnic groups such as the
Karen would not accept a democratically-elected government in
Burma and would rather push for independence. Maintaining
national unity was the Burmese regime's primary goal, Anupong
said.
COMMENT
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11. (C) Anupong was unusually open and willing to engage on
the South and Burma and he repeated promising statements
regarding investigating alleged abuses in the South. That
said, we will continue to encourage Anupong and other RTG
officials to conduct thorough investigations of allegations
by human rights organizations, especially in light of recent,
disturbing reports.
JOHN