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WikiLeaks
Press release About PlusD
 
Content
Show Headers
B. ISN EMAIL TO IO/USUN (WUCHTE/JOHNSON/WILCOX)-07/29/2008 C. USUN 592 Classified By: Amb. Alejandro D. Wolff, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The Security Council's 1540 Committee remains divided over Russia's proposal to add a ninth member to its Group of Experts. Many members support Russia's initiative, the unstated goal of which is to guarantee that a new Russian expert (Antonin Litavrin) gains a spot on the Group of Experts. Committee Chairman, Costa Rican PermRep Urbina, plans to convene meetings on August 12 and August 14 so the Committee can decide on the Russian proposal and the expertise it needs from the Group of Experts during the rest of its three-year mandate. USUN requests guidance by OOB on August 14 on whether to support Russia's proposal. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 2. (C) On July 25, only days before the contracts for its eight-member Group of Experts were due to expire, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 1540 (2004) began discussing contracts and the assistance it would need from the Group to fulfill its new mandate under resolution 1810 (2008). (Resolution 1810 sets out several new tasks for the Committee to promote states' implementation of resolution 1540 (nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction). As an interim measure, the Committee agreed on July 31 to extend the contracts for seven of the experts until December 31. The Committee still needs to decide how to fill one vacancy created by the July 31 resignation of Brad Howlett (Australia) and make longer-term decisions about the composition and size of the Group of Experts. Because it typically takes five months to hire new experts, Committee Chairman Urbina wants the Committee to decide as soon as possible - ideally this week - on: 1) what expertise it needs during the rest of its three-year mandate, and 2) how many experts it needs to fulfill its mandate. Based on those decisions, the Committee can determine whether to replace any or all of the current experts, how to handle the vacancy created by Brad Howlett's departure (France has a candidate lined up), and whether to recruit a ninth expert. 3. (C) Three members of the Group of Experts are nationals of P-5 and Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) (Victor Slipchenko - Russia, Rick Cupitt - U.S., and Olivia Bosch - UK). The other members are an Italian, an Indian, an Argentine, and an Eritrean. Russia is determined that when the contract of the current Russian member of team, Victor Slipchenko, expires December 31, he be replaced by another Russian (Antonin Litavrin) (ref C). Given that France plans to nominate a candidate to fill the spot Brad Howlett vacated, and that Russia hopes to support France's candidate, Russia is concerned that, in an open competition, Russia's nominee might not be selected to replace Slipchenko. Many of the elected members insist that membership in the Group should be balanced among NWS (P-5) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) as well as the geographical regions of the world. (Note: When the current experts were originally appointed in 2006, several non-elected members complained bitterly that only three experts from non-Western or non-P-5 countries gained spots. End Note.) To avoid increasing the overall number of NWS/P-5 nationals on the team, those elected members would likely accept either the French or the Russian nominee -- but not both -- unless Olivia Bosch or Rick Cupitt were replaced. (COMMENT: USUN will continue to push to ensure that Rick Cupitt remains on the team. END COMMENT.) 4. (C) Russia argues that expanding the Group from eight to nine members is the only way to guarantee that Russia maintains a national on the Group of Experts, that France's new candidate is added to the team, and that Cupitt and Bosch retain their berths. Russia contends that doing so is the only way to satisfy the non-European elected members, because an African, Asian or Latin American candidate could fill the additional slot and representatives of NNWS would still outnumber representatives of NWS (P-5) on the team. 5. (C) On August 5, many of the elected members again stressed that membership in the Group of Experts should be balanced geographically and among NWS and NNWS. Many members also argued that, given the expertise the current experts have gained through their work with the Committee, they should not be replaced wholesale. With the exception of the P-3, most members supported the Russian proposal to increase the number of the team, arguing that eight experts could not adequately fulfill all of the additional new tasks that resolution 1810 mandates the Committee to pursue, such as receiving summary action plans on implementation from Member States. USUN and UKUN both raised concerns about the need to add another expert, particularly given the cost of doing so (likely around USD 200,000 per year). France said it generally supported proposals to increase the size of such Security Council experts' bodies, but did not have instructions on Russia's proposal. (COMMENT: Given France's desire to place a French national on the Group of Experts, USUN expects France to go along with Russia's proposal. END COMMENT.) The Chairman agreed to Russia's suggestion to seek information from the Secretariat on the cost implications of adding another expert, but pressed Committee members nevertheless to seek instructions from their capitals on Russia's proposal. 6. (C) The Department previously advised USUN to seek to delay negotiations on the Russian proposal until the fall. Nevertheless, given the time constraints facing delegations once the General Assembly opens in September, the Chairman wants the Committee to decide on the proposal sooner, largely to allow the Committee to get past administrative start-up details and begin fulfilling its new mandate as soon as possible. USUN understands that Russia's Committee member told UKUN that Russia would block any decisions concerning experts' contracts unless the Committee accepted its proposal to add a ninth member. 7. (C) COMMENT: There are several alternatives to Russia's proposal that could still address Russian interests (as well as France's) while avoiding overrepresentation of P-5 or experts from regions outside Asia, Africa, or Latin America. One option would be to seek to terminate the contracts of either Olivia Bosch (UK) or Isabella Interlandi (Italy), thus freeing up space that the French and new Russian candidates could fill without upsetting the existing balance. Committee members are unlikely to accept that approach, however, since the UK and Italian experts both want to continue to serve, they have gained expertise during their tenure on the Committee, and the Committee has no cause to dismiss them. Italy, in particular, is unlikely to withdraw its support for Interlandi, and many members (including USUN out of concern for Rick Cupitt's position) already have opposed any effort to replace the team wholesale. (COMMENT: USUN understands that Bosch has been a divisive member of the team and is not necessarily well regarded by other team members but the Committee is unlikely to unseat a candidate simply because she is unpopular with her colleagues. END COMMENT.) Another option would be to tell the Russians definitively that that the United States will support a proposal to substitute Litavrin for Slipchenko as of December 31 without an open competition for that spot. The only spot that would be subject to an open competition would be the one vacated by Brad Howlett. Russia would then have to sell this proposal to the other P-5 and to the elected Council members who represent the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries. This approach might engender French opposition, however, since the NAM Committee members would likely insist on a guarantee that Howlett's spot would be filled by a Latin American, African, or Asian candidate rather than France's nominee. 8. (C) USUN notes that supporting Russia's proposal might be the most expedient approach in the short term. It would help secure U.S. national Rick Cupitt's spot on the Group of Experts and enable the U.S., consistent with the Permanent Members' convention, to support the Russian and French candidates once they are nominated. If USUN must continue to seek to delay consideration of this proposal and to oppose it, the Committee could remain bogged down and unable to fulfill its new mandate. END COMMENT. Khalilzad

Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000724 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018 TAGS: PREL, AORC, KPAO, PTER, UNSC, KNNP SUBJECT: 1540 COMMITTEE: RUSSIANS INSIST ON ADDING NINTH MEMBER TO COMMITTEE'S GROUP OF EXPERTS REF: A. IO/USUN EMAIL (JOHNSON/WILCOX)-07/28/2008 B. ISN EMAIL TO IO/USUN (WUCHTE/JOHNSON/WILCOX)-07/29/2008 C. USUN 592 Classified By: Amb. Alejandro D. Wolff, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The Security Council's 1540 Committee remains divided over Russia's proposal to add a ninth member to its Group of Experts. Many members support Russia's initiative, the unstated goal of which is to guarantee that a new Russian expert (Antonin Litavrin) gains a spot on the Group of Experts. Committee Chairman, Costa Rican PermRep Urbina, plans to convene meetings on August 12 and August 14 so the Committee can decide on the Russian proposal and the expertise it needs from the Group of Experts during the rest of its three-year mandate. USUN requests guidance by OOB on August 14 on whether to support Russia's proposal. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. 2. (C) On July 25, only days before the contracts for its eight-member Group of Experts were due to expire, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 1540 (2004) began discussing contracts and the assistance it would need from the Group to fulfill its new mandate under resolution 1810 (2008). (Resolution 1810 sets out several new tasks for the Committee to promote states' implementation of resolution 1540 (nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction). As an interim measure, the Committee agreed on July 31 to extend the contracts for seven of the experts until December 31. The Committee still needs to decide how to fill one vacancy created by the July 31 resignation of Brad Howlett (Australia) and make longer-term decisions about the composition and size of the Group of Experts. Because it typically takes five months to hire new experts, Committee Chairman Urbina wants the Committee to decide as soon as possible - ideally this week - on: 1) what expertise it needs during the rest of its three-year mandate, and 2) how many experts it needs to fulfill its mandate. Based on those decisions, the Committee can determine whether to replace any or all of the current experts, how to handle the vacancy created by Brad Howlett's departure (France has a candidate lined up), and whether to recruit a ninth expert. 3. (C) Three members of the Group of Experts are nationals of P-5 and Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) (Victor Slipchenko - Russia, Rick Cupitt - U.S., and Olivia Bosch - UK). The other members are an Italian, an Indian, an Argentine, and an Eritrean. Russia is determined that when the contract of the current Russian member of team, Victor Slipchenko, expires December 31, he be replaced by another Russian (Antonin Litavrin) (ref C). Given that France plans to nominate a candidate to fill the spot Brad Howlett vacated, and that Russia hopes to support France's candidate, Russia is concerned that, in an open competition, Russia's nominee might not be selected to replace Slipchenko. Many of the elected members insist that membership in the Group should be balanced among NWS (P-5) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) as well as the geographical regions of the world. (Note: When the current experts were originally appointed in 2006, several non-elected members complained bitterly that only three experts from non-Western or non-P-5 countries gained spots. End Note.) To avoid increasing the overall number of NWS/P-5 nationals on the team, those elected members would likely accept either the French or the Russian nominee -- but not both -- unless Olivia Bosch or Rick Cupitt were replaced. (COMMENT: USUN will continue to push to ensure that Rick Cupitt remains on the team. END COMMENT.) 4. (C) Russia argues that expanding the Group from eight to nine members is the only way to guarantee that Russia maintains a national on the Group of Experts, that France's new candidate is added to the team, and that Cupitt and Bosch retain their berths. Russia contends that doing so is the only way to satisfy the non-European elected members, because an African, Asian or Latin American candidate could fill the additional slot and representatives of NNWS would still outnumber representatives of NWS (P-5) on the team. 5. (C) On August 5, many of the elected members again stressed that membership in the Group of Experts should be balanced geographically and among NWS and NNWS. Many members also argued that, given the expertise the current experts have gained through their work with the Committee, they should not be replaced wholesale. With the exception of the P-3, most members supported the Russian proposal to increase the number of the team, arguing that eight experts could not adequately fulfill all of the additional new tasks that resolution 1810 mandates the Committee to pursue, such as receiving summary action plans on implementation from Member States. USUN and UKUN both raised concerns about the need to add another expert, particularly given the cost of doing so (likely around USD 200,000 per year). France said it generally supported proposals to increase the size of such Security Council experts' bodies, but did not have instructions on Russia's proposal. (COMMENT: Given France's desire to place a French national on the Group of Experts, USUN expects France to go along with Russia's proposal. END COMMENT.) The Chairman agreed to Russia's suggestion to seek information from the Secretariat on the cost implications of adding another expert, but pressed Committee members nevertheless to seek instructions from their capitals on Russia's proposal. 6. (C) The Department previously advised USUN to seek to delay negotiations on the Russian proposal until the fall. Nevertheless, given the time constraints facing delegations once the General Assembly opens in September, the Chairman wants the Committee to decide on the proposal sooner, largely to allow the Committee to get past administrative start-up details and begin fulfilling its new mandate as soon as possible. USUN understands that Russia's Committee member told UKUN that Russia would block any decisions concerning experts' contracts unless the Committee accepted its proposal to add a ninth member. 7. (C) COMMENT: There are several alternatives to Russia's proposal that could still address Russian interests (as well as France's) while avoiding overrepresentation of P-5 or experts from regions outside Asia, Africa, or Latin America. One option would be to seek to terminate the contracts of either Olivia Bosch (UK) or Isabella Interlandi (Italy), thus freeing up space that the French and new Russian candidates could fill without upsetting the existing balance. Committee members are unlikely to accept that approach, however, since the UK and Italian experts both want to continue to serve, they have gained expertise during their tenure on the Committee, and the Committee has no cause to dismiss them. Italy, in particular, is unlikely to withdraw its support for Interlandi, and many members (including USUN out of concern for Rick Cupitt's position) already have opposed any effort to replace the team wholesale. (COMMENT: USUN understands that Bosch has been a divisive member of the team and is not necessarily well regarded by other team members but the Committee is unlikely to unseat a candidate simply because she is unpopular with her colleagues. END COMMENT.) Another option would be to tell the Russians definitively that that the United States will support a proposal to substitute Litavrin for Slipchenko as of December 31 without an open competition for that spot. The only spot that would be subject to an open competition would be the one vacated by Brad Howlett. Russia would then have to sell this proposal to the other P-5 and to the elected Council members who represent the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries. This approach might engender French opposition, however, since the NAM Committee members would likely insist on a guarantee that Howlett's spot would be filled by a Latin American, African, or Asian candidate rather than France's nominee. 8. (C) USUN notes that supporting Russia's proposal might be the most expedient approach in the short term. It would help secure U.S. national Rick Cupitt's spot on the Group of Experts and enable the U.S., consistent with the Permanent Members' convention, to support the Russian and French candidates once they are nominated. If USUN must continue to seek to delay consideration of this proposal and to oppose it, the Committee could remain bogged down and unable to fulfill its new mandate. END COMMENT. Khalilzad
Metadata
VZCZCXYZ0032 OO RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0724/01 2252302 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 122302Z AUG 08 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4785 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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