PAGE 01 NATO 01781 102153 Z
44
ACTION EUR-10
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10
NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 SAJ-01 GAC-01 NEA-06 L-02 PRS-01
MBFR-02 ACDA-10 SY-02 RSR-01 /075 W
--------------------- 030896
R 101840 Z APR 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9690
SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY OSLO
S E C R E T USNATO 1781
LIMDIS
E. O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81
TAGS: ASEC, NATO
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN SECURITY CASE
REF: USNATO 1700, 5 APR 73
1. DURING 10 APRIL MEETING OF THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE,
THE NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT A
FINAL REPORT ON THE OLE MARTIN HOYSTAD CASE WILL BE ISSUED IN
THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT APPEARS THAT HOYSTAD PHOTOGRAPHED
ONLY FIVE DOCUMENTS OF WHICH FOUR WERE NORWEGIAN NATIONAL
DOCUMENTS.
2. THE FIFTH DOCUMENT WAS A COPY OF NATO CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM DATED 2 AUGUST 1972 FROM MR. VINCENT BAKER, COUNSELOR,
POLITICAL- MILITARY AFFAIRS, USNATO, ADDRESSED TO MR. GEORGE
ANDREWS OF THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, NATO INTERNATIONAL
STAFF.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE OF THE DOCUMENT REFERRED
TO ABOVE.
QUOTE:
SECRET
PAGE 02 NATO 01781 102153 Z
AUGUST 2, 1972
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
MR. GEORGE ANDREWS
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
DEAR GEORGE:
YOU AND OUR COLLEAGUES ON THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE
MAY BE INTERESTED IN THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF A RECENT
CONVERSATION ON MBFR BETWEEN MR. JAMES LEONARD, AN ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF OUR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND A
SENIOR SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON.
MR. LEONARD OPENED BY COMMENTING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING
A MISTAKE IN THEIR REPEATED EFFORTS TO DRAW THE U. S. INTO
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON EUROPEAN FORCE LEVELS, AND POINTED
OUT A NUMBER OF THE REASONS WHY WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING
THAT SEPARATED US FROM OUR ALLIES. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL
QUESTIONED WHETHER WE REALLY WANTED NEGOTIATIONS AND ANY SORT
OF AGREEMENT. MR. LEONARD ASSURED HIM THAT U. S. INTENTIONS
WERE SERIOUS, BUT THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PROTECT BOTH OUR
POLITICAL AND OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. HE POINTED TO THE VARIOUS
ASYMMETRIES IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION, CITING THE QUESTION
OF REDEPLOYMENT TIME AS A PARTICULARLY OBVIOUS ONE WHICH WOULD
HAVE TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN ANY EVENTUAL AGREEMENTS. THIS
LED THE SOVIET OFFICIAL TO LECTURE ON THE NEGATIVE REACTION
WHICH THE WORD " BALANCED" IN MBFR AUTOMATICALLY PRODUCED FROM
MOSCOW. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE
REASONS FOR THIS REACTION, BUT SAID IT WAS A " FACT" AND URGED
THE NECESSITY OF EVENTUALLY FINDING SOME OTHER LANGUAGE
TO COVER THIS CONCEPT.
THE EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE
AUTHORITIES ON HIS SIDE GAIN SOME BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT
THE U. S. REALLY WANTED TO ACHIEVE THROUGH MBFR. HE DEFENDED
THE VARIOUS FEELERS WHICH THEY HAD MADE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE U. S. AS BASED ON THE NEED IN MOSCOW TO OBTAIN SOME
REASSURANCE ABOUT WHAT WE WERE " REALLY AFTER" IN MBFR.
HE WARNED THAT IF THE U. S. AND THE USSR DID NOT CLARIFY
THEIR RESPECTIVE THINKING TO EACH OTHER BEFORE ACTUALLY SITTING
DOWN AT THE TABLE IN A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE, WE RISKED A
SECRET
PAGE 03 NATO 01781 102153 Z
VERY HARMFUL FAILURE. HE RECALLED THE SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE
OF 1958 ( DURING WHICH HE HAD HIMSELF BEEN IN GENEVA)
AS AN EXAMPLE OF JUST THIS SORT OF SITUATION. THE U. S. AND
THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME TO THE TABLE THEN WITHOUT PROPER
EXPLORATION OF EACH OTHER' S ATTITUDES AND THE RESULTS HAD
BEEN VERY UNFORTUNATE. " IF YOU TELL US", HE SAID, " THAT YOU
WANT US TO REDUCE FIVE DIVISIONS AND YOU' LL REDUCE THREE
DIVISIONS, THEN WE WILL CONSIDER THIS. IF IT' S NOT HARMFUL TO
OUR INTERESTS, WE' LL ACCEPT IT AND THEN WORK OUT THE DETAILS;
BUT WE HAVE TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT IT IS THAT YOU' RE AFTER."
MR. LEONARD ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO PROCEEDING
WITH MBFR BY RATHER SMALL STEPS, POINTING TO THE RATHER
STABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE WHICH IT MIGHT BE QUITE UNWISE
TO DESTABILIZE WITH ABRUPT CHANGES IN FORCE LEVELS. THE SOVIET
OFFICIAL ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT AS POSSIBLY HAVING REAL MERIT,
EVEN THOUGH, HE AGREED, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PAST HAD
TENDED TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR VERY SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTIONS.
MR. LEONARD ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT SOVIET ATTITUDES WOULD
BE ON VARIOUS TYPES OF CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES OF THE
SORT THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE 1950' S AND, IN PARTICULAR,
AT THE SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE. HIS INTERLOCUTOR THOUGHT THE
USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THEM.
MR. LEONARD ASKED WHAT SORT OF MEANING THE SOVIET SIDE
ATTACHED TO THE PHRASE " CENTRAL EUROPE" WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD
AGREED WOULD BE THE AREA PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN FORCE REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS. THE EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID IT SHOULD INCLUDE THE
TWO GERMANYS PLUS WHATEVER OTHER COUNTRIES IT MIGHT PROVE
GENERALLY CONVENIENT TO ADD. THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE FRENCH
POSITION AND WOULD NOT EXPECT FRANCE TO BE INCLUDED.
MR. LEONARD ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THE AREA COULD INCLUDE PORTIONS
OF THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO TROUBLE
AT ALL, PROVIDED THE EASTERN U. S. WAS ALSO INCLUDED.
MR. LEONARD ASKED IF THE SOVIET SIDE WAS REALLY SERIOUS
ABOUT PUSHING " EQUALITY" TO THAT EXTREME. THE ANSWER WAS YES.
IF PART OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS COVERED, PART OF THE US SHOULD
ALSO BE COVERED. THE OFFICIAL ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT AIR FORCES
IN THE REDUCTION AREA SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO CSCE, HE SIMPPLY REITERATED
SECRET
PAGE 04 NATO 01781 102153 Z
THEIR WELL- KNOWN POSITION THAT THE CSCE SHOULD NOT TAKE UP MBFR.
I AM SENDING A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO ALL DELEGATIONS.
SINCERELY,
VINCENT BAKER
COUNSELOR, POLITICAL- MILITARY AFFAIRS
END QUOTE
RUMSFELD
SECRET
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>