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ACTION ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15
TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04
DRC-01 /165 W
--------------------- 074514
P R 240918Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1341
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 VIENNA 0618
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
FROM US REP MBFR
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING JAN 22, 1974
1. SUMMARY. THE AHG MEETING OF JANUARY 22 ADDRESSED THE
EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT MADE EARLIER THAT MORNING; BILA-
TERAL CONTACTS WITH THE EAST; AND THE POSITION PAPER ON ALLIED
TACTICS FOR THE CURRENT SESSION. US REP REPORTED ON TWO
BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE
NOTED THAT CONVERSATIONS SHOWED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A WARSAW
PACT WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A COMMON CEILING IN AIR AND GROUND
FORCES, SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE MANPOWER DISPARITY MAY BE
CHANGING.
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2. UK REP HAD FINALLY RECEIVED DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
TACTICS PAPER. HE STATED AUTHORITIES IN LONDON WERE CONCERNED
THAT IN INTRODUCING FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, NATO MIGHT BE MAKING
A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION TO OBTAIN A MERE PROCEDURAL
AGREEMENT; THEY WERE ALSO WORRIED THAT THE PAPER MIGHT COMMIT
NATO TO REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND
THAT IT MIGHT IMPLY NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE
INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. A LENGTHY DISCUSSION
ENSUED. CHAIRMAN CONCLUDED THAT ISSUE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED
AT THIS MEETING. END SUMMARY.
COMMENTS ON POLISH REP'S (STRULAK) STATEMENT OF 22 JAN 1974
3. CHAIRMAN (DANISH REP - TILLISCH) CALLED FOR ANALYSIS OF
STRULAK'S SPEECH IN THAT MORNING'S PLENARY (TEXT SEPTEL).
U.S. REP CALLED ATTENTION TO STRULAK'S SURPRISE THAT THE
WEST SHOULD INFER THAT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR
CONFLICT WERE RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
RATHER THAN TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. U.S. REP
THOUGHT THIS WAS A POINT THE ALLIES SHOULD CLARIFY AND EXPAND
IN FUTURE PLENARIES.
4. FRG REP (BEHRENDS) AGREED. HE NOTED THAT STRULAK WAS SAID
TO HAVE GIVEN PRIORITY TO CRITICISMS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS
BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INDIGENOUS FORCES;
THERE WAS ALMOST NO MENTION OF AIR FORCES. HE ALSO MENTIONED
STRULAK'S STATEMENT THAT BY LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO ONLY US AND
USSR FORCES, THE WESTERN PLAN WOULD INVITE AN ARMS RACE IN
CENTRAL EUROPE, THIS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE COUNTERED BY NOTING
THAT AN ARMS RACE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE EAST WOULD AGREE
TO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING.
5. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) SAID THAT THE ALLIES MUST REPLY
TO THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT THE WESTERN PLAN CALLS FOR THE
EAST TO REDUCE THREE TIMES AS MANY MEN AS THOSE TO BE REDUCED
BY THE WEST AND THAT THIS WOULD ENDANGER EASTERN SECURITY.
NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD COUNTER THIS ARGU-
MENT BY AGAIN POINTING OUT THAT UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS DO NOT
AUTOMATICALLY ENDANGER SECURITY AND IN THIS CASE THEY WOULD
ENHANCE IT; THE EAST'S DEFENSIVE PURPOSES WOULD STILL BE
FULLY COVERED. THE NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW
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THE WHOLE TONE OF THE STRULAK SPEECH WAS SOMEWHAT STRONGER;
HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ALLIED MUST GUARD AGAINST PROCESS
OF HARDENING OF POSITIONS THROUGH MERE REPETITION AND SHOULD
ACTIVELY SEEK TO EXCHANGE NEW IDEAS AND MOVE THE TALKS AHEAD
OR BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME INFLEXIBLE.
6. US DEP REP NOTED THAT IN COUNTERING THE EASTERN INFERENCE
THAT IT IS THE WESTERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS RATHER THAN EASTERN
CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT ARE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING, THE
ALLIES SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE EAST ALSO POSSESS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN THE AREA, RATHER THAN WEST ALONE AS IMPLIED BY
STRULAK REMARKS AND KLEIN PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD ADD
CREDENCE TO THE ALLIED CONTENTION THAT THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND
FORCE IMBALANCE COULD LEAD TO A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.
7 CANADIAN DPE REP (MORGAN) AGREED THAT THE ALLIES MUST STRESS
THE INEQUALITY OF GROUND FORCES AS THE POTENTIALLY DESTABIL-
IZING FACTOR. HE FURTHER STATED THAT STRULAK'S EXPRESSION OF
SURPRISE AT THE ALLIES CONTENDING THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES
WERE MORE LIKELY TO PROVOKE A NUCLEAR CONFLICT THAN NUCLEAR
FORCES SEEMED TO BORDER ON PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATION,
SOMETHING THE EAST HAD NOT ENGAGED IN IN THE PAST. THE CANADIAN
DEP REP SAID HE FELT STRULAK DISTIGNUISHED BETWEEN AIR AND
NUCLEAR FORCESON THE ONE HAND AND NATIONAL FORCES ON THE OTHER.
HE HAD SAID AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES HAD TO BE INCLUDED, BUT
NO REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THEIR INCLUSION FROM THE OUTSET,
WHILE IT WAS STRESSED THAT NATIONAL FORCES MUST BE INCLUDED
FROM THE BEGINNING.
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ACTION ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15
TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04
DRC-01 /165 W
--------------------- 074611
P R 240918Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1342
SECDEF/WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR/SHAPE
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 VIENNA 0618
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
BILATERALS WITH EAST
8. THE CHAIRMAN DIRECTED THE GROUP'S ATTENTION TO TWO REPORTS
DISTRIBUTED BY THE US DEL: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DELOFF KVIT-
SINSKIY ON JAN 21 (SEPTEL); AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET REPS
KHLESTOV, SMIRNOVSKY AND KVITSINSKIY ON JAN 17 (VIENNA 491).
9. US REP SAID HE WANTED THE GROUP TO TAKE NOTE OF THREE POINTS
IN RELATION TO THESE BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS. THESE WERE THE REF-
ERENCE DURING THE MEETING ON JAN 17 THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE
ABLE TO CONSIDER A COMMON CEILING IF BOTH AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER
WERE CONSIDERED. THE SECOND WAS THE CHANGING SOVIET PERCEPTIONS
OF THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER DISPARITY IF BOTH AIR AND GROUND MAN-
POWER WERE CONSIDERED. THE THIRD POINT WAS THAT THE ALLIES
SHOULD BE CAREFUL HOW THEY USE INFORMATION GATHERED VIA BILATER-
ALS IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH EASTERN REPS. IF USED IMPRUDEN-
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TLY, IN WAY WHICH CAUSE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO EASTERN SOURCES, THE
EAST WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
WEST AND FREEDOM OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE DIMINISHED. ANOTH-
ER ITEM OF INTEREST TO THE US REP WAS THAT KVITSINSKIY THINKS
THAT PRESENT DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH ON PROCEDURES CAN BE OVER-
COME. US REP WAS NOT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT A REDUCTION IN THE FRE-
QUENCY OF PLENARIES.
10. THE UK REP AGREED THAT WE MUST NOT EMBARRASS THE EAST OR WE
WILL INHIBIT CONTACTS WITH EAST; HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT HE FELT
IT WAS IMPORTANT AS AN INDICATION OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY FOR ALL
THE ALLIES TO INDICATE TO THE EAST THAT ALLIES DO CIRCULATE IN-
FORMATION GATHERED VIA BILATERALS THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN GROUP.
11. THE FRG REP NOTED THAT WHILE THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CIRCU-
LATED THEIR BILATERALS REPORTS AMONG EACH OTHER, SUCH WAS NOT THE
CASE WITH THE EAST AND THAT THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR NOT
LOSING THIS INFORMAL METHOD OF CONTACT.
12. THE FRG REP SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONLY KVITSINSKIY
OF EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING A COM-
MON CEILING. US DEP REP NOTED THAT KVITSINSKIY HAD MADE HIS MOST
RECENT REMARKS ON THIS TOPIC IN THE PRESENCE OF KHLESTOV AND
SMIRNOVSKY AND THAT NEITHER HAD DISAGREED.
13. CANADIAN DEP REP REPORTED CONVERSATION ON JAN 17 BETWEEN
CANADIAN REP AND RUMANIAN DEP REP (POPESCU) WHO HAD SPECIFICALLY
ASKED CANADIAN REP TO REPORT HIS VIEWS TO THE AD HOC GROUP. PO-
PESCU SAID THAT THE ROMANIANS WANTED PLENARY MEETINGS TO BE HELD
WITH REGULARITY, BUT THE SPECIFIC NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF MEET-
INGS WERE UNIMPORTANT. THE ROMANIANS FELT THAT ALL PARTIES MUST
BE REPRESENTED AT ALL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THEY
DID NOT APPROVE OF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM SINCE NO ONE COULD REPRE-
SENT ROMANIA AND THEY COULD REPRESENT NO ONE. POPESCU SAID HE
FELT INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN NUCLEAR
FORCES AS SUCH AND INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS SHARED THIS VIEW.
POPESCU ALSO PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING FRG FORCES
IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT.
14. THE FRG REP REPORTED ON AN 18 JAN MEETING BETWEEN FRG DEP
REP (HOFMANN) AND ROMANIAN DEP REP (POPESCU). POPESCU WAS STRONG-
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 02 OF 05 241334Z
LY OPPOSED TO THE EMISSARY SYSTEM AS THIS WOULD NOT ENABLE THE
ROMANIANS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DEMANDED TO
BE INFORMED OF THE CONTENT OF MEETINGS CONDUCTED UNDER THE EMIS-
SARY SYSTEM AND SAID ROMANIANS WOULD CONSIDER WALKOUT FROM VIENNA
AND/OR TAKING THE MATTER TO THE PRESS IF THE ROMANIANS WERE NOT
REPRESENTED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. POPESCU SAID
THE SOVIETS DO NOT KEEP THE ROMANIANS INFORMED OF THEIR CONTACTS
AND THAT IF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM WERE RESORTED TO, ROMANIA WOULD
BE IN SAME CATEGORY AS YUGOSLAVIA. THE ROMANIANS WOULD LIKE TO
SEE A REGULARIZED SCHEDULE OF PLENARIES, BUT DID NOT CONSIDER THE
ACTUAL NUMBER TO BE OF IMPORTANCE.
15. FRG REP CONTINUED HIS REPORT WITH AN ACCOUNT OF A CONTACT
HE HAD WITH POLISH REP STRULAK. POLISH REP SAID THAT POLAND HAD
SOME DOUBTS ABOUT SMALL INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL
PARTICIPANTS. STRULAK SAID IF ONLY SOVIET FORCES IN GDR WERE AD-
DRESSED IN THESE MEETINGS POLAND WOULD HAVE NO ROLE AND NO BASIS
FOR PARTICIPATION, WHICH WOULD BE A BAD OUTCOME. STRULAK WAS IN-
SISTENT ON THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES IN ANY AGREE-
MENT, REFERRING TO THE POLISH CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, BUT
DID NOT MENTION ANY REFERENCE TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES. THE
POLISH REP INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE MANPOWER COMPARISONS
WERE A VALID INDICATION OF COMBAT CAPABILITY AND STRESSED THE
NEED FOR ANY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS MANPOWER.
STRULAK INDICATED HIS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE INCLU-
SIONS OF FRG FORCES FROM THE BEGINNING.
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ACTION ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15
TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04
DRC-01 /165 W
--------------------- 075104
P R 240918Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1343
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 VIENNA 0618
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
16. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT RECENT EASTERN
REFERENCES TO AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES ARE
VERY INTERESTING. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AHG LOOK
INTO THE IMPLICATION OF THESE FIGURES FOR THE
WESTERN PROPOSAL AND WESTERN TACTICS.
17. UK REP SAID ANY POLICY CHANGES ON THESE
ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED AT NATO THOUGH
AD HOC GROUP COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS. ITALIAN
REP SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD LOOK INTO THE SOVIET
CONTENTION THAT IF AIR MANPOWER WERE INCLUDED THE
DISPARITY IN MANPOWER FIGURES WOULD BE MITIGATED.
18. THE US REP SAID THAT HE EXPECTED WASHINGTON
TO FORWARD NEW US ESTIMATES ON WARSAW PACT AIR
MANPOWER TO NATO SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT THE
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z
PRESENT NATO FIGURES INDICATED THAT IF AIR MAN-
POWER WERE INCLUDED THE 150,000 MAN DISPARITY
IN GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO AN EASTERN
ADVANTAGE OF 60,000. HE SAID THAT FROM WHAT HE
HAD HEARD OF NEW FIGURES, THEY APPEARED TO
INDICATE A BALANCE IN AIR MANPOWER AND THEREFORE
THEIR INCLUSION WOULD NOT NARROW THE GAP AS REGARDS
CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE NETHERLANDS REP NOTED
THIS INFORMATION SHOULD REINFORCE THE ALLIED CON-
TENTION THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES
SINCE THAT IS WHERE THE DISPARITY LIES. THE UK REP
SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE NEW AIR FIGURES,
BUT DID NOT THINK IT WAS THE TASK OF THE VIENNA
DATA GROUP OR AD HOC GROUP TO ASSESS THEIR IMPLICA-
TIONS; THIS MUST BE DONE IN BRUSSELS. THE US REP
AGREED WITH THIS, BUT FELT THE VIENNA DATA GROUP
SHOULD REVIEW AND PRESENT NEW FIGURES WHEN AVAIL-
ABLE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE AHG CAN ASSESS THEIR
IMPLICATION FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.
TACTICS PAPER
19. CHAIRMAN THEN OPENED DISCUSSION ON THE TACTICS
PAPER (VIENNA 0401 AND 0482). UK REP STATED THAT
HE HAD FINALLY RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL DETAILED INSTRUC-
TIONS FORM LONDON, ESPECIALLY ON PARAS 5, 6 AND 7. UK
FONOFF FEELS THAT IN PRESENT FORMULATION OF PARA 5
NATO IS GIVING UP TOO MUCH FOR A SMALL SOVIET SHIFT;
NATO AGREEMENT THAT PHASE 2 NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN
AFTER A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME IS A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION
IF GIVEN WITHOUT A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING.
THEREFORE, IN FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW, ALL OF PARA 5 SHOULD
BE DELETED AFTER THE FIRST SENTENCE. THE LAST SENTENCE
OF PARA 6 ALSO CAUSED PROBLEMS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO
FIND A FORMULA THAT DOES NOT SINGLE OUT THE FRG AND THAT
DOES NOT COMMIT NATO TO REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS AS WRITTEN; THE SENTENCE COULD IMPLY THAT
ALL EUROPEAN FORCES (INCLUDING THE UK) WOULD BE RE-
DUCED. THEREFORE THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ: "IF
THE RUSSIANS PERSIST IN ASKING WHETHER 'OTHER FORCES'
WOULD INCLUDE BUNDESWEHR, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z
POINT OUT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
IS AMONG THE ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS."
20. UK REP SAID FONOFF FELT THE DIFFICULTY WITH
PARA 7 IS THAT THE SPECIFIC ALLUSION TO A SOVIET RIGHT
TO RAISE SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THEM COULD IMPLY THAT
THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR
FORCES IS NEGOTIABLE. THEREFORE, PARA 7 SHOULD EITHER
BE DELETED, OR IT SHOULD READ: "IN RESPONSE TO
SOVIET REQUESTS FOR ALLIED ASSURANCES ON INCLUSION
ON AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIES COULD SAY THAT
THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS IN DISCUSSING THE FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO US
AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO
REJECT THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES."
21. CANADIAN DEPREP ASKED UK REP TO TELL THE GROUP
WHAT IN UK VIEW COULD BE OFFERED TO THE EAST AS AN
INDUCEMENT FOR THEIR PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT IF ALL THE
PROPOSED UK CHANGES WERE ACCEPTED. UK REP RESPONDED
THAT THE FIRST PART OF PARAS 5 AND 6 WOULD BE OFFERED.
US DEPREP NOTED THAT SUBSTANCE OF FIRST SENTENCE OF
PARA 5 INCLUDED IN ALLIED PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOTABLY
CANADIAN STATEMENT OF JANUARY 17, THAT "FOCUS" LAN-
GUAGE AS REGARDS COVERAGE IN PHASE 2 DID NOT DIFFER
ESSENTIALLY FROM FORMULA REPEATEDLY USED IN ALLIED
PLENARIES THAT PHASE 2 WOULD "INCLUDE" FORCES OF OTHER
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT ALLIES WERE GIVING
SOVIETS NOTHING ON NUCLEARS ON AIR IN THE PROPOSED FOR-
MULATIONS. THE UK HAD LEFT STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE
INTACT IN PAPER AND HAD KATKEN AWAY THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE
IT. UK REP REPLIED THAT THE MAIN POINT OF CONCERN TO
LONDON WAS THAT NATO WAS ASKING FOR SOMETHING SMALL
AND OFFERING SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT.
22. NETHERLANDS REP POINTED OUT THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT
BE MAKING CONCESSIONS SIMPLY TO OBTAIN A DISCUSSION
OF SOVIET/US REDUCTIONS; THE ALLIES ARE NOT GOING TO
GIVE UP ANYTING SIGNIFICANT FOR TALK ALSONE. THE ULTIMATE
ALLIED PURPOSE IS TO CONVINCE THE PACT TO ACCEPT SOVIET/US
REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND A GROUND FORCE COMMON
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CEILING. TO GET THIS AGREEMENT, THE ALLIES MUST
EVENTUALLY PUT SOME SUBSTANCE INTO THE LINK BETWEEN
THE TWO PHASES. THIS LINK WOULD ACTUALLY GO IN AN
AGREEMENT ONLY IF THE EAST AGREED TO ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET/US
REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND A COMMON CEILING TO BE
ACHIEVED IN THE SECOND PHASE. US REP COMMENTED THAT
AN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING IS CONTEM-
PLATED AS PART OF PHASE I, AND A STATEMENT TO
THAT EFFECT MIGHT BE PUT IN PARA 5. THE US DOES NOT
WANT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREEMENT TO A COMMON
CEILING. BUT ALLIES DID NEED MINIMUM AMMUNITION TO
SERVE AS BASIS OF DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS. FIXED
PERIOD WAS ONLY NEW ELEMENT AT ALL IN TACTICS PAPER.
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ACTION ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15
TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04
DRC-01 /165 W
--------------------- 075118
P R 240918Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1344
SECDEF/WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR/SHAPE
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 VIENNA 0618
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
2*. ITALIAN REP STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT PARA
5 BEFORE, BECAUSE THE ALLIED POSITION APPEARED TO BE THAT A COM-
MITMENT TO THE INCLUSION OF ALL NATIONAL FORCES IN PHASE 2 WOULD
BE TRADED FOR A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SOVIET/US FIRST PHASE
REDUCTIONS. NOW THAT UK FONOFF HAD OBJECTED, HE INSISTED THIS
POINT MUST BE CLARIFIED OR AGREEMENT ON PAPER WOULD NOT BE POS-
SIBLE. US DEPREP POINTED OUR THAT THERE IS NO REAL SOVIET INTER-
EST IN A "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AS SUCH, BUT RATHER IN DETAILS OF
PHASE II. IF THEY NEVERTHELESS ACCEPTED ALLIED LANGUAGE ON LINK-
AGE, THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTING THE WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT. THIS
WOULD BE A USEFUL CONCESSION FROM EAST BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE AC-
CEPTING IN PART THE TWO/PHASE PROGRAM WHICH THE ALLIES WANT. THUS,
INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS FIXED PERIOD AT LATER POINT
WOULD NOT BE A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION ON PART OF ALLIES, BUT ITS
ACCEPTANCE BY EAST AS ALLIED CLARIFICATION WOULD BE A GAIN FOR
ALLIES. NATO MUST OFFER THE EAST SOME LIMITED INDUCEMENT TO ENT-
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 04 OF 05 241426Z
ER THE TACTICAL UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED. THE UK PROPOSALS DO NOT
OFFER ANYTHING; IF FOLLOWED THERE WOULD BE LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT
OF SUCCESS. PERHAPS LONDON DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROPO-
SALS UNDER DISCUSSION. ALLIES WERE FACED WITH EASTERN DEMAND TO
NEGOTIATE ALL FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO BRING
THEM OFF THIS IF ALLIED APPROACH WERE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE. UK REP
RESPONDED THAT HE HAD FAITHFULLY REPORTED ALL VIEWS AND THEY HAD
ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED IN LONDON. BELGIAN REP STATED THAT HE
AGREED WITH THE US DEPREP THAT IF THE EAST ACCEPTED THE PROCEDURAL
ARRANGEMENT, IT WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR
PHASING CONCEPT. IT WAS TIME TO MOVE IN THIS WHOLE AFFAIR. DE-
LAY COULD BE COSTLY.
24. ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE THIRD SENTENCE OF
PARA 5 COULD BE CHANGED TO READ "... THE ALLIES, AFTER CONCLUSION
OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT BASED ON THE ALLIED PROPOSAL,
COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START
WITHIN A "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME'..." NETHERLANDS REP ASKED IF THIS
MEANT THAT THE ALLIES COULD ONLY MAKE THAT STATEMENT AFTER A PHASE
I AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. IF SO, IT WAS UNUSABLE. HE FELT THAT
NATO SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE COMMON CEILING IS A MAINSTAY OF
ITS POSITION AND THAT THIS IDEA SHOULD BE MADE EXPLICIT IN THIS
PAPER. US REP SUGGESTED THAT LANGUAGE FROM PARA 6 MIGHT ALSO BE
PLACED IN THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA 5. INSTEAD OF THE PROPOSED ITAL-
IAN CHANGE, REVISED SENTENCE MIGHT READ: "... THE ALLIES, FOLLOW-
ING A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT
ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND
PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START WITHIN A 'FIXED PERIOD OF TIME'..."
NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT THIS CHANGE MIGHT STRENGTHEN NATO'S
POINT. CANADIAN DEPREP AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY CON-
CERNED WITH THE CONTENT OF PHASE 2 AND TO BE SURE PHASE 2 ACTU-
ALLY TAKES PLACE, NOT WITH ITS TIMING. THEREFORE, IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO REVERSE PARAS 5 AND 6 IN THIS PAPER.
25. UK REP STATED THAT US REP'S INSERTION IN PARA 5 WAS AN IM-
PROVEMENT TO THE DOCUMENT. HOWEVER, AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 4, PARAS
5 AND 6 ARE TO BE USED TO REACH THE GOALS LISTED IN PARA 2. NE-
THERLANDS REP SAID THAT PARA 4 PROVIDED FOR THE ALLIES TO BE CARE-
FUL TO FORMULATE TALKING POINTS AND NOT GIVE A COMMITMENT TO IN-
CLUDE SPECIFIC NATIONAL FORCES OR AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN
PHASE 2. UK REP CONTENDED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THE SOVIETS WOULD
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IGNORE THE ALLIED QUALIFICATIONS AND ASSUME THAT NATO IS COMMITT-
ED TO INCLUDE ALL NATIONAL FORCES IN PHASE 2. US DEP REP STATED
THAT IT WAS UP TO WESTERN NEGOTIATORS TO INSURE THAT THE SOVIETS
DID NOT IGNORE THOSE ALLIED QUALIFICATIONS. NETHERLANDS REP
STATED THAT PRESENT TEXT WAS NOT YET IN FORM OF A NEGOTIATING
BRIEF. US REP STATED THAT THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 4 WAS INTENDED TO
MAKE POINT THAT NATO'S NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE ANY
COMMITMENT NOW, BUT ONLY TO SAY THAT PHASE 2 WILL BEGIN WITHIN A
FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, PROVIDING THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IS
AGREED, AND REMAINDER OF AGREEMENT IS SATISFACTORY.
26. ITALINA REP SAID THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND AGREE-
MENT ON NUMERICAL LEVEL IS THE KEY TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT. THIS
WAS NOT SO OF FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND/OR FIRST PHASE LIMITED
TO US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. CANADIAN DEPREP STATED THAT HE HAD
ASSUMED THAT COMMON CEILING MEANT A GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING.
US REP COMMENTED THAT AN OFFER MADE BY NATO COULD ONLY BE ACCEPTED
IN THE FORM MADE AND THAT NATO WOULD NOT BE LEGALLY BOUND TO AN
EASTERN COUNTER-OFFER SUCH AS ONE FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES.
ITALIAN REP ASKED WHY THE WORDS GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING WERE
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PAPER. US REP RESPONDED THAT NATO HAD EMPHA-
SIZED ITS INTEREST IN THE GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING IN A NUMBER
OF PLENARY STATEMENTS. ITALIAN REP REJOINED THAT TO INCLUDE THE
WORDS GROUND FORCES MIGHT PRECLUDE A MISINTERPRETATION. US REP
STATED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS' TALKING POINTS MIGHT DO THIS, AND OF
COURSE IT COULD BE ADDED TO TEXT.
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PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 05 OF 05 241425Z
44
ACTION ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15
TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04
DRC-01 /165 W
--------------------- 075111
P R 240918Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1345
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 VIENNA 0618
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
FROM US REP MBFR
NETHERLANDS REP ADDED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE WARY OF
THESE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. A GOOD WAY TO NEITHER ACCEPT NOR
REJECT EITHER SIDE'S SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS IS TO HOLD BACK
ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THE
UK AND ITALIAN REPS WERE CORRECT IN SAYING THAT ALLIES
SHOULD NOT MAKE ALL OUR CONCESSIONS AT ONCE. US REP COMMENTED
THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT OVERAL SITUATION--THAT
THE FIXED EASTERN POSITION, FREQUENTLY REPEATED IN THEIR PLEN-
ARY STATEMENTS, WAS TO EMPHASIZE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF
NATIONAL, NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE WAS
TO POSTPONE THE NATIONAL PHASE OF REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND
PHASE AND THEREFORE THE SOVIETS MUST BE GIVEN SOME INCENTIVE
TO NEGOTIATE. THE UK VIEWS WERE A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM,
NOT A SOLUTION TO IT.
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 05 OF 05 241425Z
27. THE ITALIAN REP SAID THAT THE TACTICS PAPER COVERED TOO
MUCH GROUND. THE DISCUSSIONS ENVISIONED HERE WILL ONLY
COVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS; THEREFORE, THE AHG SHOULD ONLY
KEEP THE FIRST PHASE PART OF PARAGRAPH 5 AND PREPARE ANOTHER
PAPER REGARDING LINKAGE TO PHASE 2 WHEN THE PROPER TIME COMES.
UK REP AGREED AND CONTENDED THAT THE AHG SHOULD NOT BELIEVE
THAT THIS TACTIC WILL COMMIT THE EAST. THEY ARE NOT BOUND
TO DO ANYTHING BUT TALK, AND NATO WILL HVE GONE QUITE A WAY
BEYOND ITS CURRENT POSITION.
28. THE CHAIRMAN CONCLUDED THAT THESE ISSUES COULD NOT BE
RESOLVED IN PRESENT SESSION AND SUGGESTED DISCUSSION BE CON-
TINUED IN NEXT DAY'S MEETING. HUMES
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